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"The social problem, the problem of oar coiaaon
existence, is in i- -s$ politics
through and through, and nothing' else but
politics. V.
cause-and he does not deserve the name of man
that would wiihho.l evo bioa-
belongs to politics, foreign and domesticj#.»"
(Thomas &ann: "The Magic riountain")
To answer the question cosed by ay subject is to
the situation of the young PHD candidate wi
hem meed his doctoral disse: /:big all b
eoncluGions in mind, and intend".
.
-.search, only to support
the^u 'lie question der^ands an Lsceral reaction,
course -viable der.tooratic







is possible l n The logic is faulty, but the reaction
is almost irresistible. To cc = alternatives is to think about
unthinkable and that we are not prone to do. One is n
±ncc :
;
itting that deaecracy presents some pro. tor-
foreign policy, and with the h:. a number of critic
def. . .rocracy we will . ro exa$ $to i*
1» Thomas Mann, The Ha nt&in, (Dor Zaubev
H, T» Lowe-Porter trans #,

2Alexis Dc Tocqueville asaminad the American phenomenon, in
1831-2 and set the scene for future criticism of American
democracy. Perhaps because some of his predictions were so
uncssinily accurate, his position as a critic has remained valid
in the -rinds of oodarB readers, even though many of the conditions
he observed no longer exist, find institutions have changed, a
only quantitatively but qualitatively. In addition he was not
illible in his predictions* For instance;
"I foresee that all the military rulers who
may rise up in the ,;;reat democratic nations
will find it easier to conquer with their
armies, than make their aaroiea lira at peace
after conquest."2
Precisely one of the najor criticisms which have historically
been Bade of democracies is that they disarm too quick. :;r
wars, and rather than experience difficulty living at peace with
their allies, find they cannot keep the peace because they don't
have any armies to speak of* In spite of these reservations
about his omniscience, one can hardly open Da Tocqueville without
coming across a paaaagw that is gaxvtlBS to our discussion*
"It is difficult to iiake the people participate
in the government^ but it is still more difficult
to avpply them with axpayianea and to inspire
than with the feelings which they will need if
they are to govern well* I grant that the
wishes of the democracy are capricious, its
instruments rude, its laws ircperfect. But
it were true that no $ua aim would exist
between the rule of desoocraay and the dominion
of a single man, should we rather not incline
*towards the former * ; to the latter. i.3
2. Alexis Be Tocqueville, Democracy in America , iliehard D*
Jlaffner, Ed., p. 273
3. De Tocquevillo, op. cit
. p. 137

Here from an early critic we nay find at least a good part
of the crux of the problem posed* "it is difficult to make the
people participate in the government. •" if we are to have a
•working detaoeracy, and if groat gdlms, such as an effective
foreign policy are not to be irreconcilable with cieiaocratie
government, we rnuat solve the problem of "participation" or the
lack o£ it on the part of democratic peoples*
viag raised the problem of participation, i wdsh to
abandon it here, temporarily, to consider a second problem which
may shod some light on cur subjrct. That problem is one of
select uiv, leadership, for even democracies must be led, and the
process of selection, by which folly, "the beat" rise
the top of the neaj> is essential in any state* Ferh«ps nothing
in Soviet-American relations caused MMPt speculation than
whether or not the monolithic Soviet Union would be able t©
solve the problem of succession after the death of Stalin.
Obviously the Soviets found a way to solve it for the time, but
their institutions don't appear" to guarantee that it wiii be
accomplished so painlessly ©very time, or at my assured interval.
It is possibles fee tfeUtt t&e burden of criticism from the
institution of democracy to those who have led democracies in
times of difficulty, aid MM for blaming the
not the "people" for the historical failures of democracies in
foreign affairs.
This is of course an easy way out, a "devil theory"
perhaps, useful for explaining: Ike Aaoiph hitler, but not

so easy to apply to democracies. It could allow the corporate
whole to demy responsibility, cince the blame is to be placed
on their scapegoat, the lee o was stupid, weak,, short-
sighted, or evil. The reason it is difficult to apply in a
democracy is that the people choose the leaders, they have m
Opportunity to "tur.2 the rascals eut% and it if ot
to hold thee responsible for their choices. Still there may be
some excuse for the people don't have men of quailiy
to choose amc -.en -.irnx of stature, wisdom, fo:
judgment do not seem to present themselves in times of difficulty,
and the people choose the h a bad lot.
can scare farther in time, at least, in the
Western tradition than Thucydi istory of the Pelopannesian
War to discover hoi-.' long: both of the problems we have introduced
91 concerned the peoples and historians of che &est# The
words Thucydides attributes to Pericles in his .Funeral Oration,
and his justification of v the Plague of Athena are
to the point*
(8 give our obedience to those whom we put in
.tlons of an I we obey the lews
©selves. ». ttk
"...even those who are - led wi1
own busii . . .1.1 informed
on general politics - U i a peculiarity of
ours: we do net Say .-.a who taa.es no
interest in politics ; . w tins lindi
own business! we si iat he has iiq business
hBTQ at all." 5




Thus we see that these are the newest and the oldest problems in
the world. In spite of Perielese* boast* Athens hadn't really
solved the problem. In Pericles© they had undoubtedly managed
to choose the best among them as a leader; their effective foreign
.icy, (war in their case) had been adopted after full discussion
by well informed men, and still disaster fell on Athens with the
coming of the plague* This factor, the unanticipated plague,
might be used to demonstrate one more theme* When judging the
effectiveness of a foreign policy, and the society which
adopted it, the fact that all things are not foreseeable, or
for that matter controlabl© must be considered* This is the
manner In which Perielese explained it*
"So far as I am concerned, if you are angry with
rae you are angry with one who has, 1 think, at
least as much ability as anyone else to see what
ought to be done and to eaqplain what he sees...
As for me, I am the same as 1 was and I do not
alter; it is you who have changed* what has
happened is this* tou took my advice when you
were still untouched by misfortune, and repented
of your action when things went badly with youj
it is because your own resolution is weak that ay
policy appears to you to be mistaken* "«
Leadership such as that displayed of Perielese is essential
to a democracy. Every now and then it Is necessary to e^lain
the unpleasant facts of life to the people* eiore often than not,
they will respond to the challenge* It is when the leadership
tries to shield the people from the unpleasant, and pursue a
policy of weakness because they don't trust the people to respond,
h i <i » ' mm
6* Thucydides, op* cit * p. 130

that democracies get into trouble. Perhaps we can find coeumenta*
tion for this rather sweeping statement later in this pacer.
We have added a third theme then to our original problems
of persuading the people to participate effectively in government,
and ei> the best among us to lead, Tw third theme is in
short, that all things are not possible, foreseeable, or
controllable, and we should not judge democracy by a standard
which is beyond the attainment of any form of government. Charles
Barton Marshall in his "The Limits of Foreign iolicy" restates
the proposition for us in this manner*
3 capacity of the ?aind to conceive ends is
limitless. The means at hand are invariably
limited. The level of intention involves above
all the establishment of a balance between ends
and means « that is if one is responsible in
his undertakings. • .All this applies to foreign
policy. w '
It follows, I think, that if we fail to succesefuly aecom j.isn
all that might conceivably havo been dono, it does not .:tean that
our foreign policy has not been effective, only that the
circ :\j have dema ^re than we were capable of
achieving. Nations, unlike inC i men are not to be char
with Robert Browning's admonition in *•Andrea ael s>arto":
"Ah but a mm 9* reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for.""
Rather it must be admitted that some things cin, and others
cannot be done, and what is more important, a choice must be made
7« Charles Burton .^larshall, The limits q£ Foreign -alley,
excerpted in Ivo D. Cuchacek, Conflict" and Cooperation Among; .'ations , p. 3°2
• Robert crowning, Ancirea del barto, in aartlett's Faailiar
Quotations . Christopher Horely ed.., p. )

in the allocation of resources, whether material or human, to
til© problems which are most vital to the preservation of a given
society. The difficultias inherent in tlriis allocation, and the
problems involved in even aalculatlii oar capabilities will be
discussed at length in the pages to follow. At any rate, insofar
as our discussion relates to democratic governments, it must be
admitted that the allocation would be easier in a society where
man exists for the state, and not the state for man*
It may be inferred from the foregoing that I am concerning
myself with the American experience and the American prospect
more than with the problems of democracies in general* while the
foibles and criticisms of other nations will be considered, it is
appropriate that the discussion be centered on the United States,
which, while young as a nation, might well be considered the
oldest continuously democratic nation in the world, begging the
question of a universally acceptable definition of democracy or
democratic government. In addition, no matter how one attempts to
qualify his statements, what applies to one democratic government,
need not necessarily apply to another* Therefore, I will attempt
a defense of the foreign policies of this democratic government in
particular, and others in passing*
Bertrand Russell in his lectures for the BBC, collected as
"Authority and the Individual*1 points out just how young the
ideas of democratic government are.
%..th© western nations first, and gradually the
whole world, have awakened to a new ideal. Ml
are no longer content that a few should orijoy all

the good things, while the many are wretched...
this new belief is now so generally taken for
granted that it is not sufficiently realized
how revolutionary it is in the history of
nankind*"^
With this idea of newness In aind, and having determined
to pursue the three thanes of participation, leadership, and a
rejection of the expectation of oanipotenes in foreign affairs,
I was struck by the similarity between my laboriously ©solved
prescript for a successful raature, democratic United States, in
her pursuit of an effective foreign policy, arid the "essentials"
set up by Millikan and Blackster in their book, "The Emerging
Nations" for the transition of a forater colonial oligarchy to a
modern deraocratic state. They require these things:
"One of the snoot essential requirements is to
raise drastically the number and quality of
people capable of administering the societies
business."!
MA second major med is to eaqpand greatly
popular participation in political life..."
"Lastly...Whsre there is ignorance of the limits
of the government in affecting social and economic
conditions, people tend to see those with
political power as ossiipotent and therefore
wholly responsible for progress."^
The authors adssonish the i»ature dersocraeics to assist and teach
the transitional oligarchies to aeconjplish the three things that
we ourselves have not been able to acco^lish with perfection
over our long history of development under ideal conditions, and
with a ssiniiaum of outside interference*
9. Bertrand Russell, Authority- and the Individual. p» U7
10 • Max F. aillikan and Donald I * • Bla&mer,
Nations, p. $4
11* fad.* P. 6U
12 » SI»» p* ®s*

All this is not to be decried or accompanied with a great
wringing of hands. It is only idealistic dreamers who expect
it to be any other way, and it is to be hoped that they are a
dying breed* Democratic government is still an experiment* it
is extremely new, and only rocenl, led. Alternative forms
of government in the history of nations have nothing to reco;a»iend
them over the fumbling efforts of democracies, if the good of
all as opposed to the good of a few is admitted as a legitimate
aim of government.
Democracy has never wanted for critics, fc/hUe in the
words of Professor raul A, iieab ?.ry of the University of California,
many unthinking defenders of democratic government have a great
propersity to "...wrap themselves in the African Flag Ml sing
the Star Spangled Banner," the critics have probed the weaknesses
of democratic government as thoroughly as a biologist dissecting
a frog, Still democracy's deesicated corpse keeps resisting
their efforts and obdurately demonstrating continuing life and
vitality.
^ven the critics have their critics. Professor Gabriel A,
Almond has said, speaking of political scientists:
"*be systematic analysis of policy alternatives,
or the analysis of basic social, psychological,
and economic factors as they apply to policy
problems ,*( is) definitely a very minor thetae
among political scientists. ,. ;ihen it can fairly
be concluded that fee political scientist leaves
largely to his student and lay aujSlenee, the
important task of evaluating policy alternatives. oi3




If the proponents of democratic government are given to
flag waving and anthem singing, the critics must bear the
burden of negativism, abandoning the tough questions of what
we can do and how, for the easier subjects of what we failed to
do and why* This is not to say there is nothing to be learned
from the past, but only that the institutions of democratic
government have borne a disproportionate share of the blame for
the failures of the past* This theme is here siraply stated!
it is hoped that it will be proved, or at least supported, aa
some of the criticisms of failures of foreign policies of
democratic states are examined*
So as not to be accused of shooting fish in a barrel, by
attacking someone like the insraensely vulnerable C, Wright Hills,
who qualifies as a critic, if m% a v&ry profound thinker, let
us try the highly respected Walter Lippman* His classic, and
oft-quoted criticism of the great democracies is as follows;
"•«• there has developed in this country a functional
derangement of the relationship between the oagfl
of the people and the government* The people
have acquired power which they are incapable of
exercising., and the governments they elect have
lost powers they must recover if they are to
govern* *•**•**
Mr. Idgprnsn goes on to say*
"Where mass opinion dominates the government,
there is a raorbid derangcrnent of the true
functions of power* The derangement brings
about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis,
of the capacity to govern* This breakdown




In the constitutional order is the cause of
the precipitate and catastrophic decline of
western society,**3
Wiat Mr. Uppmann appears to be saying is that government
officials pay too much attention to public opinion, and thus are
too frightened to act at all, or if they do act, they act
unwisely in accordance with the unintelligent desires of the
iminformed and unwashed masses, (Alexander Hamilton's "Great
Beast")* if this were ail he said in this short and pithy
passage, we might be inclined to shake our* heads and press on.
This wouldn't be the first tins Walter Lippman had attacked a
straw man called Public Opinion,
v
ik> also attributes to this
phenomenon an unarrested, precipitate, and catastrophic decline
of Western society.
And yet, what does Mr. Lippman we-an by this decline? That
wealth and power in the world are no longer the private preserve
of western iSurope and the United States{ that the ftpiilt colonial
empires have been dissolved md replaced with coriaaonwealths aid
unions of nations} that long exploited China is unified, and
has become a world power, albeit not on our terms} that the
"American Bream" has been successfully exported to the far
corners of the world, and that a perversion of it, the economic
promise of a good life, planned for but not yet achieved in the
Soviet Onion, has been shown to have 3oraa attraction for under-
developed countries? If all these things are to oe construed as
15 • Lippraan, op . cit., p. 19




a catastrophic collapse of the west, perhaps Walter Lippraan is
correct.
It seems likctly that, writing in 195U, or 5$, with the
economic recovery of Vlestern Europe not yet complete, with China
«pd SasterfjJ>\irope paying court to the Soviet felon rather than to
the Isest, with nuclear parity a new and frightening phenomenon,
and the re-mafcin:' of the world ten years after World War XX m
apparent failure; with Korea divided, Viet-Nam partitioned, with
"massive retaliation" revealed as a non-credible threat, with the
Dulles policy of "liberation" discredited by the Hungarian
revolution, and the future as always in doubt, flr. I&ppmaa had a
right to be discouraged, and to look for the cause in the
weaknesses he felt he could see in democracy. I !m sure with the
wisdom of hindsight he had a "If we had only..." for every setback
of the post war years.
I would not talc© issue with Mr. lippman's concept of the
"Public Philosophy," or hi3 pis a for a return to some belief in
a natural law, and a sease of order and propriety in things. I
do think it altogether possible that he has read too much
disaster into the history of the twentieth century.
Gordon A. Craig's book entitled "Europe since 1815"
presents a good workmanlike history of the events which led to
orld Wars I and II. Other books which have chronicled our
successes and failures, and the problems of the world since
World War II are as numberless as the leaves in the forest and on
the sands of time. The wisdom of hindsi^ht has so many faces
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that to salute them in passing is beyond husaaa endeavor. In the
preparation of his "international Politic* and i-'oreign Policy,"
Jaracs N. i-tosenau acknowledgrs the assistance of two youns ladies
in covering for hira some ninety journals (emphasis xoine) in
order tot
"..give (s) the editor reasonable assurance that
no articles were ommitted from this volurae through
inadvertence or ignorance."1 '
The events chronicled by Craig, the other historians of the
period, the books of political scientists, and the contributors
to ninety journals should have bean enough to discourage anyone
old enough to have lived through them, ^ai .an is old
enough to remember a good deal, of those events, and in addition,
he was "involved", in his thinking, and his writing. (In 1912,
18
Mr. Lippman was already writing for the ftew Xork Times.)
3o many times in the twentieth century the great democracies
were presented with challenges requiring what Kenneth Thompson
has called j
"...the moral resources for acting when we cannot
foresee the consequences of our actions, for choosing
between practical alternatives weighed down with
ambiguities and Imperfections, and for guiding the
people to accept the things they Right do if they
had the grasp and knowledge that their leaders
possess ."19
17. James N. Rosen au, International Politics and foreign
footer > p- 3.
18. Dwight Macdonald, The New iork Times, Alas* Alas» bsquire,
LIXsl06, Hay 1963.






So many tiraes we have been found wanting* It ia not extra-
ordinary in the least that Hr« Lipp^sn should hold Britain, raiioe
and the United States res lo for lotting World U'ar II
happen, since no later than 193^ they had. the power to prevent
it had they not lacked eith r, "the moral resources i'or actin ,
or the Perlclean virtue of being able to "...look into the future
and see there hi osslbilities for good or evil."
Still I object to Mr, Lippraan's using the institutions of
democracy as the scapegoat for World War II, and the failure to
find peaoe and stability following it» If that old balancer
of power, Oreat Britain, is to be held, responsible, or rr/chcr
the masses of her "democratic" people, pnonc whom did they have
to ehooiie for leaders in the period of their peril, Ra.-isey
HaeDonald, utanley Baldwin, and Seville Chamberlain. Is there
no guilt to be apportioned arcong the leadership, or ought the
people in their sovereign wisdom, in the absence of any "j^reat
debate" to have had trie prescience to sweep into office, {in a
write in campaign, a revolution?) a viinston Churchill, or an
Alfred Duff Cooper, two relatively discredited politicians who
hadn't kept their fences mended, but were able to see what was
coming*
Those rant people whom .alter Lippnum accuses of iranosir,
"••a massive negative.. .at critical junctures
when a new general course of policy needed to be
set., "21
20. Thueydides, op. cit . p. 90.
21. Lippman, op. cit ., p. 22,
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rebelled when they discovered the plan of Pierre Laval of France,
and Sir Samuel Hoare of Great Britain to give Mussolini very
extensive tracts of Abyssinia and virtual control over its trade
resources, and in ef 'ect, buy the assistance of Mussolini in
controlling Hitler's threats, by cooperating in the consolidation
of hie own aggression. Craig quotes Alfred Duff Cooper as saying,
"During my experience of politics, I have never witnessed so
22
devastating a wave of public opinion." A massive negative,
perhaps, but a negative to a policy of appeasing agression.
If the leadership of the Britisn democracy was really canr,rolled by
mass public opinion, might they not have interpreted this reaction
of the people to appeasanent of an aggressor as a viandate for
action of an entirely different nature? ±o carry the might have
beans a little further, If the League of Nations, dominated by
Great Britain, had successfully opposed Mussolini with really
effective sanctions on oil shipments, Bight they also not have
found the courage to combine effectively to forestall ilitler in
his early aggressions? Instead, we know that the British people
were lulled into complacency with assurances of "peace in our
time," the French, their system of alliances scuttled by Great
Britain's lack of backing at crucial times, crawled behind weir
I'liginot Line, and the stage was set for the Hitlerian era, and the
innings of our present *©«*»*
22 • Gordon *. Craig, Europe Since 1 :;!>' , p. 682
23. Ibid., pp. 693-703'.
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It is not my intention to do a historical survey of all the
foreign policy .failures of the twentieth century, *% or-
pose of pointing out, in ever , that the failure was not
necessarily the fault of the people, or of any peculiarity of
democratic government. But since there seems to -o than
a suspicion that democratic government ism within itself the
seeds of its own destruction, and that destruction will come about
through failures to develop effective foreign policies, tt should
be appropriate to examine the fatal flaw or flaws, if they are
discernible.
ftost :>oliticcl writer fee agree that the great mass
of the people, not only docs not know what is going on, but
does not want to know. In addition, most adult, -hat even if
the people did want to know, a complete grasp of all the
complexities of our interdependence with o tiier nations and
groups of nations is ocyond their . Indeed there arc few
writers who would claim that they hr. -,-& all the facts, that they
are capable of deciding all the problems, and making all the
thousands of judgments that have to be made- every day which
affect our relations with other nations, aid in .;any cases our
future.
V* 0. y^ey, in nis "Kiblic Opinion and American Democrac/"
makes use of a great bod],' of data y.;\thered by the Michigan Purvey
Research C^ter to establish *•*§ criteria for the real interest
and influence of the people on government. He draws some
interesting conclusions about the problem of "selection of leaders"
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which was raised earlier*
"The travails of democracies in the past half-century
have tarnished the teage of elections as an insfcruntent
of popular decision. Abortive installations of
democratic practices in nations scattered over the
world hare contributed to this disencnantatnent, thou
the moral may be that democratic procedures are workable
only under some circs.-. ee« and then only hy :
habituated to their requirements, •
•
Obviously one cannot maintain that public opinion
is projected through elections with a -iiino
clarity to a- accord
with patterns it prescribes in precise detail, IX ftatitl
were the reality, governi-ii/tits would be hwastrunt;. . . •
lections cannot be regarded solely as a conduit for
tift@ transmission of policy '..references to the govern-
ment. They also express other judgments and
preferences - such as those about eg es and about
past performance of go\rernjnent-». ,i ^
I have quoted at length iron K-ey, because his work has
had considerable influence on the approach I nave taken in this
paper. He points up the need .eater participation of the
people in the decisions of government, but limits Lao,;;, because
of their inherent limitations to broad areas of policy, on very
general topics. He demons urates how very great are tii -;es
necessary to shake the people out of their apathy, but points out
that this can be a blessing in disguise. In what awounts to a
very effective answer to V/alter Lippman's accusation of tne
paralysing effect of public opinion on the politician, he states*
?1Furtherraore, translation of opinions into actions
of electoral punishment or reward is a tortuous
and uncertain procedure* Xhe predictability of
electoral response to a particular action remain*
so uncertain that the avoidance of a seasx
decision because it will lose votes is usually
the work of a Balk whose anxieties outweigh his
capacities of prediction," 2£
2h« dey, op, cit ,, p, UJ-;~9
%&+ lkid », pp 5^7-*8
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I think the foregoing paragraph ought to be required reading
for all politicians who worry about the folks back home* and
required reading for Walter Llppman i to feel that the
masses have their .fingers on the jugular vein of poveri^iuTl
.
Perhaps it Is fruitless to explore the quest,!on .re
power lies in o democracy. It is altogether possi t. it
doesn't stay in one place, and certainly the debate has raged for
many years, in different approaches and methods. 0. bright iiills
was mentioned earlier. Unlike Salter Lippraan, h
in the hands of a clique of the big rich, the corporate boss
26
the military brass, and a few key politicians.
people have taken pot shots at illc ior me to add ray critique,
except to point out that his fchfcfid sytnptoiTiatic of the fact
that the exact i s of a democracy are not completely Known,
and there is support for airiest any theory of power relationships
between the governors and the governed, except one that takes all
factors into consideration, and still :nakes MS*** ^oininp can
be more dangerous in o-?, &r political writing, or in foreign
affairs for that matter then a. uivocal statement, and yet if
we hesitate to say anything without a support train of qualifiea-
tions, we run the risk of saying nothing at all. Vhe "Last Fress
Conference" of Richard Nixon after his defeat in the California
Gubernatorial election might be a case in point. Mr. Nixon saids
"This is wy last press conference... .you won't have
Hixon to kick around any r;ioro." 27
26. U. Wright r-iills, a he t Q,:er £).lx,e, pp. 25y~297
27. Richard K« H ixon, quoted in The Oakland Tribune, Oct, 7, 1962*
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To my recollection there have been many interviews with
the press since then, perhaps not press conferences, perhaps he
doesn't rate them my mora, dttll "last proas c- as
•.uivocal enough.
If we may abandon the d ., and tne yhole suujact of
the derangement of power in i deriiocracy, and exi. , teas crlti
who are not* specific, perhaps we can proceed to general
conclit froa concrete instances, ra\ ,.• deal
with the iraplic ations of generalities unsupported fey t actual
situations.
Herman Kahn in his monuracntai effort "un Thermonuclear War"
states his nisgivi siocr&cy in a fairly typloal arawgi
live in a democracy, one of the characteristic
weaknesses ox democrat an inability to carry
..t complicated long term vm xn a steaofast
arid competent way....I have some suggestions for
improving lon^ term policy piaviin -...one way- to
this is to wake a serious attempt tx> lift the
level of discussion. I believe it oe done, bat
only if there is on one hand sane self restraint on
the part of those who are trying to facilitate &
program by the use of i language and, on the
other \m f much Mvt itanrmn trtifcinta* ana punish-
ment i or those who are •. ar oversisv :.ng
issues wh«R it
I can't take issue with tne last part of Iirm Kahn's
statement, claiming the level of discussion is tantamount to
increaeinr participation in ^overnraetiti and is part of the three
pronged pro ran tm -oved democracy i pS9p**m4 in one beginning
of this paper. I can and do take issue with nis statement that




democracies are unable to cany out complicated long term pro rams
in a steadfast and competent way. 'lis statement is flatly contra-
dicted by the speech of the Honorable Dean Acheson delivered as a
Mclnemey Lecture at the University of California, on March 13,
1963, Kr» Acheson stated;
"•.Let us have a look, after the high wind of last
January, at the state of well - or ill~being of what
he.:, been probably the most long continued, enlirhteaed,
extensive, and successful endeavor in history* What
has been done since the end. of the last war, a period
of less than twenty years, is nothing less than the
restoration of allies, friends, and former enemies
alike after shattering experiences * and the building of
a Western Buropean-North American nexus to deal with
tli© world wide dangers and problems of an entirely
new world* m29
I don*t think Mr. Acheson overstates his case. Wo tend to
look at the events which took place after World War II, md think
of them as one series of preventable disasters/ Korea divided,
Viet &m partitioned, Sastem satellites in bondage, nuclear
monopoly lost, China Communist, and think of the whole period,
OS Walter Lippman obviously does, as a period of catastrophic
decline for the West. I think more statements like Mr. Acheson'
s
are called for to balance the picture, and put the great things we
have done in some sort of proportional juxtaposition to our admitted
failures* I am not prepared to admit without an argument, that we
could have prevented the Indo-Chinese debacle, disfunctions! as
the society was, nor an I convinced that the Korean war was not as
Herman Kahn calls it, in "Thinking About the Uhthinkable," a war
which will probably go down in history as, "•••the right war, in
»——«wi> i«iii ;ili» 1 aM^in iM!!—!*
29* Sean Acheson, Speech delivered on the Campus of the
University of California, Berkeley, California, i'iarch ^3, 1963, on
deposit in the Library of the University of California.
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the right place, at about the right time.""^ I'» not sure that
there was anything we could have done about the defection of
China from the west, mless we were prepared to invade, and stay*
mid if we had, the problem of disengagement from our occupational
responsibilities would make our present problems of eo-existerice
with a hostile China look like child's play*
In short, our record in foreign and domestic affairs in
the period following Vtorld MM II conforms, in my opinion, much
more accurately to the picture which Mr* Aeheson paints than those
who would look back on it as a string of defeats unrelieved by
a single victory.
I have purposely avoided trying to define heretofore what
an effective foreign policy is, or might be# Perhaps the discussion
of long continued, enlightened, extensive and successful endeavors
is a good place to bring it up. In the first place as a nation
state, an effective foreign policy ;auat be in the national interest,
both short and long range, which only brings up another question,
what is the national interest, and if we can define it, can we
recognise it when policy alternatives are being considered* Truly
it is beside the point, for our discussion, unless it is asserted
that there is something peculiar about a democracy which renders it
more incapable than some other form of government of recognizing its
own national interest.
the question with regard to the United States is complicated
30 # Herman Kahn, thinking About The Unthinkable, p. 173
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by the fact that, in addition to our foein*; a democracy, we are
a giant among nations. For a nation that looms as large as the
TJhited States in the world, no >olicy at all, is a for olicy
with far reaching effects on friends and enemies alike, Peter 3*
Kenen has titled his recent book just that appropriately enough,
"Giant f'motij: Nations." Basically it is a review of our foreign
economic policy. The magnitude of our involvement with practically
everybody is made quite clear. The complexities of the problems
involved are pointed up by the fact that someone had to decide,
in preparing the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 19>o that
"Pregnant Mare's ^rine", had to be included in the escape clause
of the act.-*1 One wonders what they do with the stuff, but it*s
in the table, and the U. 3. Tariff Commission was required to
consider it £long with other commodities in their deliberations.
With this introduction, it might be appropriate to consider
just one lon^ term policy, or endeavor which Herman Kahn seems to
doubt our ability to conceive mid carry out.
Kver since the accession to the residency of franklin D.
revolt, this country has been pursuing a policy of encouraging,
and attempting to arrange for freer trade among nations. The path
has not been easy, and the process of educating the American people,
and particularly the business community who felt their special
interests were threatened has been a long and complicated one.
Administration after administration, President after President,
the policy has been held to, while the misgivings of domestic
31. Peter B. Kenen, Giant Among Watlons» p. 68.
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producers have been allayed with devices which offered limited
protection from the beginning, and have gotten lees and less
protective ever since*
The Trade expansion act of 1$ :tt be considered the
culmination of the policy.
Aside from the question of whether or not the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 is a good law or not (and it is) the process
by which it was enacted Is illustrative of just how effectively a
democracy as large and complex as ours can function, when a vital
interest is at stake, and enlightened leadership is available to
formulate and carry out a policy.
The Committee on Mays and Means of the House of Hepresen-
tatives was charged with the responsibility of draftin the new
law. It was President Kennedy's "ilust" legislation for ly62.
Hearings were held over a period of months. Over one thousand
eight hundred and fifty persons or organizations either appeared
before the Committee, or submitted documents for the record*
The hearings when completed comprised six volumes with about 6J0
pages to the volume, totaling approximately 2,967,760 words* *
The shock troops of the Kennedy Administration wended their way
to the hearing room one by one, the Secretary of Agriculture
representing the farriers, more than the administration, or the
country as a whole, the Secretary of Commerce representing the
business community in a dual role calculated to induce schitaoplirenia,
having to protect the interests of those whose production would be
32. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and tiean*, Bouse
of representatives, £ighty»Saventh Congress, Second Session,




hurt by increased imports, while plugging for a law which would
allow those who must export to bo able to compete in world markets.
The Secretary of Defease, as c an of the purehasi. .er of
$f&,000,000 ,000 appeared to eali.-hten the c ** (Mt the relation-
ship between national security and foreign trade* The Secretary of
the Treasury brought up the problem of the geld outflow and the
balance of payments problem, while the Secretary of State arrived
with all the implications of foreign policy as affected by foreign
economic involvement fairly tumbling over themselves in a plethora
of arguments in favor of an effective act which would allow the
President flexibility, and power in dealing with increasin
independent, wealthy, and self-sufficient allies and friends, with
particular reference to the European Common Market, which was
ftiabling toward, in spite of all our efforts, a protectionist
policy which threatened to close off or diniinish our access to the
richest market in the world with the exception of our own domestic
establishment.
Among the non-governmental persons who appeared, mi^t have
been found a cross section of Africa. The Gewwttfce* patiently
heard them all, and then reported out the law which finally became
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 * It was as much a statement of
long range foreign policy as a speech by the Secretary of State,
or a treaty with one of our allies.
Section 102 is called, "Statement of Purpose,"
"The purposes of this act are, through trade agreements
affording mutual trade benefits-
(1) to stimulate the economic growth of the United
States and maintain and enlarge foreign markets for
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the products of United States agriculture, industry,
mining and commerce
j
(2) to strengthen econcsaic relations with foreign
countries through the As out of open and non-
discriiainatory trading in the free world} and
(3) to prevent Cofiirminist economic penetration," 33
The Act is a considerable advance over former Trade Agreement
laws in many ways. It gives the President great powers of raising
and lowering tariffs in agreement with others, and it extends his
powers for five years, so that the law a:td the President will have
a chance to prove themselves, even though a hue and cry iaay be
raised over sorae specific action which may be taken under the act.
Section 252 is of particular interest, because it represents
a departure from the "most favored nation" principle in cases
where discriMinatory policies a: rainst our agricultural products can
be "retaliated against" only by raising tariffs on the offender's
industrial products. Sections 301 through 330 provide means for
lessening the adverse effects of increased iiaports on sections of
the econoiay or population, which include, financial assistance to
those harmed* tax relief, technical assistance, labor re-training t
allowances to displaced workers, and relocation assistance.
Section 2u3, which might have been expected to draw some
protest from the administration was accepted with hardly a murmur •
It provides for two Senators and two Representatives to be members
of the negotiating team that negotiates agreements under the act.
ht the Executive Branch to have cried "Foul J" relying on
traditional separation of powers, or did someone learn from the past?
33. Public Law ^?-?9U, (?7th Congress, HR, 11970, October 11,
1962, The Trade Expansion Act of 1$>62,
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One is reminded of the speculation that if President Wilson had
taken Senator henry Cabot lodge to haris with aim, the United
,.ht have joined the IfliMpij of imtiona, and once again,
trapped ixi "wj ave beeni>, !l <-orld War iX ftAQfrfe RQt nave h^pened*
One might well say t-nat this it; a very difficult way to
make foreign policy, and M»% aay totalitarian state could have
produced Hm sacve law without so much sweat, strain said effort.
Democracies take months to make up their minds, they hedge their
bets with restrictive clauses, Uhey have to take into consideration
the interests of special groups, find the national interest of the
state is not so well served as it Bight be, if the interests of
the state are paraatount, and the people, with all their manifold
wants, needs and desires can be essentially ignored*
There is no answer to this except that perhaps we can
afford to be a democracy, M&d o triers cannot* lord Bertraad ftusaaLl
calls our erperb .:,, "The iu&cr i&y of Life*"^4, M&ftt 01 as have
more thai a passing interest in its preservation* It is appropriate
to ask, as does this essay, whether we can afford a democratic form
of govemuent, and still survive, accepting the fact that if we
cannot pvrsua an effective foreij^n policy, survival is impossible.
Perhaps we are cast upon ttiMi horns of a ittfriMMU If we wish
to rw.ain a democracy, we cannot have an effective fore jlicy,
and if we do not have an effective foreign policy we will not
survive* Thus we must choose betvjeen abandoning the "American
of Life" for the present, m i -iso the world in which we live
3h* Russell, ou^ c. :.t «, p. 6
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will not allow us to hav© our cake and eat it too. X don't think
we are so driven to a choice so limited* On© »ay grant that in
certain situations, the necessity to work through democratic
processes is a handicap, but to abandon our way of life for soa©
other alternative is to set a course through uncharted seas, toward
an Undefined shore, with the promise that the voyage, at least
in the tinws we shall know, may not be worth the effort.
On that gloomy note, perhaps I may be allowed to abandon
my role as defender of democracy idr the moment, and contrast the
sue o.?.so of the Trade Expansion Act, with the ordeal of adlai
btev;iiocn during the Cuban Crisis of 1°62»
In the now famous article in the Saturday Evening Post of
December 8* 15*62, Stewart ^Isop and Charles Bartiett accused Adlai
Stevenson of "Wanting a Munich" because he allegedly brought up
the possibility of trading our obsolete missile bases in Italy
and Turkey for a missile free Cuba* The disturbing tiling
course, was not that such a proposal was raade, or discussed, or
even that it was a good or bad idea iinder the circumstances, fhe
truly disturbing aspect is that it should have been considered
iiqproper to have considered this as one alternative, or K*ore
properly, as a possible course of action* Stevenson may I-iave
been doing some thinking. He was entitled to a hearing, as well
as those titeo may have sted a massive invasion, or a flight
of bombers over the 3ovi<*t Unlon«
%% Stewart Alsop and Charles bartlett, la fiuoe of Crisis ,
Saturday SvefiJag Post, December ':;, 1962, p» 20
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This tendency of Americans to think that only the aggressive
and th© strong, the violent mi intransigent can be patriotic,
or have the best, interests of (fee -hited States at heart is more
than disturbing* it is & . , cqueville
ta3ked long ago about the tyranny of the majority as b«$a$ one of
the weaknesses or demoerac; in America,-^ The villification of
treason ior hawing pfaooifcOd a "Ber*8 position in a room full of
"Hawks" is a problem we haven't /at solved.
When the Luce publications leaped to Ambassador Stevenson's
defense, they made more of a point that he probably hadn't proposed
the swap at all than that he had a right and a duty to laake a
serious proposal of this nature. -v.?,inK4 in their sweeplag
attack on the Saturday SfWWttJ »t*i " Irresponsible Journalism"
brushed the periphery of the problem saytrv
'Aside from so ,-nstrable inaccuracies in the
story, the whole hawk-dove theme was a vast over-
simplification. £ rt to examine all
possibilities, everyone at the executive committee
meetings offered ideas that they were not willing
to live or die by. That was the advisors fenction-
the final decisions N§3*Q the iVesifeot's,"-**
Time was of course -min^ itself with the possibility
that Charles Bartletb, a crony of it, was bein:; used to
-oacsaaor -teveason ouli of hia t the United Nations,
and not particularly with the real need for advisors and decision
makers to oring up fcbt mipie as vrell as the alatable when
vital issues are busing di&eu
ings that are disc behind closed doors in the
36* 2* Tocquevilici, op* cit« h ill*
37. The Stranger on S "ad, Time -iaeaaine, Vol, IXS .,
No. 2k, Decoder 1U, 1962, p. 13.

Executive Branch, are not often "leaked" as was apparent in the
Jtevenson case. Presumably there will be laore oare taken in the
future in any case. Still there are iftQMt otnor things that are
essentially undiscussable in the United states* iiecognition of
•ted China . bo taken as a a la point, i don't tlttoft it is
beyond imagining that it night b m interests of the lilted
States to reco nize Hed China at .tare ti;:ie. If ;iayono who
prof to discuss the question with any hint that the affirjoa-dlve,
is v i2n of possibility, he had better look to ids
sec ice, and e the sins of his past life if any,
;>ec<'iise they ore in danger o ir«* The terror • earthy
era ic aot ca:npletaly past -- - \ on has
seen fit to rescue so t of the reputation of J. Robert
er by awarding hist thi ' for his
contributions both to theoretic m of atomic
energy.-'
Max Lerner has been i
I in the case of eyalty hunts aud t
search for * subversives, ' the effective stimulus
has not been .majority hyst-.-ria but a cold campaign
by pressure groups in the hunt for sows particular
very, A new feature on the landscape of American
power is the 'vetoe group', which pretends to act
in the name of the majority but actually terror ;.zes iW**
Onco again tfl have rai:?od a problem which is not susceptible
of c olution. There is definitely a dauber in u i true
non-con formist i. -Lea, m a bearded
38, The Ks* iorker, April &/, i'./6j, p. $$«
"ornor, Th;to ^roups
t
; hyity Tyranny, in




conformist who steps to the sound of an "inatitution-J.iaed"
different drunrier, and whose tfWMCTfflHiftffff is a form of conformity
itsol '. ist and do eftpa in MNMP where Uve
vetoe groups have staked out their claixas, or luass opinion has
I
.: :.: aicer &W i'-»
..ill on. ers if we . .. :ion posed in our
sublet head on. If one gpa . u . ;.. heno:a^non of democracy
was »t Bee«a5»arll5 maibli :gn
St a Id ... _es which embraced
inciples, and if on -\t on occasion, democracies
ore C*$m&3 eonceivLv and complicated
foreign affsirt ...rapean • . ,
yrvr to the ^cation pO0«4 b .;oay topic &o be an
unqualifi >, Democrat:; ... ivt, foreign
policy &ra nob trreeoneiiafci
I don't feel that ail unqualified n ^o" has been supported as
yet. ffii aight answer, "Mc, .. irreconcilable
if.«." T .repose to consider fl now, i proposed
tliree requirements for a mature and effective democracy in the
earlier portion of this work* .Lated Is&Q ifs.
If we achieve a high level rticipation by Uiose l
arc capable of unforstandiri: orations of the
United States, if #e develc. ohoose cc i% ioaaers, and if
we SPecogntte that there are I we cannot do, eUoor
domestically or in foreign policy, . o-d not conclude that
democratic gQTeraiaftt and a licy i
irreconcilable* These are ny subjective judgments, but they are
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not entirely unsupported by concurring opinion*
Kenneth Thomson In his "Political Idealism and the Crisis in
id Politics lias said J
"...we find also in hisiv los of loaders vrho
pierced Uie veil .
course o.f history more clearly than their contemporaries* ..
lern in. oniric »iees to
replace superior human ;|udf*ssnt, no substitute has
been found for practical m /;
replace unique moral and intellectual endowments* M^"
I agree with Mr* Thomson* that even in a deraocraey we must
depend to a large degree on the wisdom of unusual men* «ie have
not always raised tnew to a position si ;.>ower in our society*
Indeed, udegard and :-,osetxbium in fchs&r selection oi F>i<Mang< in
sAfrican Government" include a passage from H* Ustrogorski in
which he states:
"Yet when you carry your thoughts back to the scene
which you have just witnessed and i line
of presidents, you find. that, if they have not all
been great men-far from tfc* tteSjf were all twwg^




. U&es ears oi drunkards, .ie
children, and of the d ^tato3* MU^
let it would be a mistake to assume that only the office
of the President requires taorality or greatness* There is a need
for men of the highest type in all the councils of frovernr^at, and
when there are no longer enough willing to @o to Washington, and
sacrifice their Presidency of the Ford ifotor Company, or their
endowed chair at a university* then the republic is in great peril*
There is a time to go to washing- to , but there is also a fefeM to
be willing to go home, as Barbara. Tuehnan points out in her portrait
iiCU Kenneth \i, Thompson* L - :. Crisis in
sJorld iolitics> Princ -u> Press* pp* §*F
' hi* tetrogcrski* K Cri view of the Convention ..•
in Peter H« Gdegard. and 'victor Rosenbluai, Documents and rceadlnfcg*.
American Gov I, p* 95.
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of Thomas B. Reed, Weaker of titan opreseniatives in the
clo.v . ars of the nineteenth century,
MIf he retained his office eeftftf his duty
would be to carry the administration's prolan
through the ho 1 ?. rivet* te-
tions. ic> stand by his convictions meant
Hill of tfae ; . vy.
there was only one waj out,.,, in April lo ,
after the close of the Fifty-fifth, Congress he
startled I olitie&l w &th the announce-
ment that he would no date for re-
oction as speaker, and shortly afterwards, to
the sensation, he announced he would not run
•ain for Congress."
Not very mwy politicians ftnAgu from the government over
principle these days. To ste: aside gracefully is not in the
program of a en who have ; ..dd in their sinecure.
possession of power is stronger wine than that provided oy
maoy or social position. And yet there is room &t tine top for
the best,
ofeesor dans Merganihau Ion i tioaal sopport for
isy proposition that :aen, as well a& t
•overrent axe essential to effective foreign policy, or for
failures of for oiicy for that matter, lie sayss
"The uj>s and downs of British power are closely




Coming signify the s ^.tish
as well as of British powerj while lord iforth arid
}
Mevillo Chamberlain stead fer the decline of beth**^
l, always »e% fettered petrfeap* by some of the institutions
,
but more frightened of the bhey need be, and responsible
U2, Barbara Tuchnan, Czar 1 t> «* African Heidi-a,
Volume nt, Suuiber 1, December 1962, p. io2.
U-3* Hans J. ma, • lh\»
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for leading, not fearing public opinion, or any other hob-goblin
•which seems to stand in their way may bo the answer to cur
problems.
On the subject of groat 90ft Lord Beriraud SuflfialX, una
may be a bit aiscredited now baoautt* el darted espousal
of "peace at any price", had SGftMl rr,'. and rflRiu
MI cannot think of anythiftj ;;ind hfta gained
by the existence of Jenghia Xahn. I do not know
what good came eg itooespierro, and for ..y partg 2
see no reason to be grateful to Lenin* But all
these men, j-ood arid bad alike, bad a quality which
I should not wish to see di or fro?a the world-
a quality of energy and Personal initiative, or .
.
independence of mind, and of imaginative vision. "***
It is difficult to disagree with Lord Russell in this.
Individuals do not MMtt to q&m t&fflttg so often now, and wh<
do, they are stifled by a society bo highly organized that the
talents of the individual mat be channelled, or he must be
forcsd to specialize if he is to get on in the world. The require
generation of generalists, of men able to dermic;, vision and fore-
sight, of those who are grounded in the tradition of Western
civility, of Malta* Lippwian's "Public Philosophy" perhaps, arc
small in number. It is necessary to ask whether democracy has
caused this decline, or if the answer lies elsewhere, in "The
Organisational Society" perh:vs, a phanor/ienon not confined to
desaocracies. Robert Fresthus discusses the "upward mobiles'* or
young ~ien who are going to set ahead in these terras,
nfo avoid controversial matters, to create an aura
of unlimited ..ishi
, aft I by
discreet name dropping may appear rather negative
Uu Russell, op. cit .j jh 32.
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but these are sl^ilfleant criteria in the
bureaucratic situation where *personaiity , and
'wericing with the team 1 are vital** *% taking a
fism stand en practically anything, the individual
may alienate someone and thus jeopardise a career
potential, The costs of tfce resulting conformity
may be feign****?
Part of our problem may 11© here, and 1 think it is safe
to say that this bureaucratization is not necessarily to be charged
as a private sin of democracy* Big nations are almost inevitably
highly organised} with organisation cooes confomity} with
conformity comes the loss of individuality and independence of
mind} with these losses over a period of time is likely to come the
decline of the society* This is of course a gross oversimplification,
but it is symptomatic of the fact that, easy as it is to criticise
democracy, it ought not to be Kiade a universal scapegoat for our
failures, in foreign policy, or in any other area of enterprise or
'&& danger that lies in putting the blatae on desiocr&cy as
such* is inherent in the reaction I described in my earlier pages*
m are committed to democracy with all its imperfections and
weaknesses* We aren't about to give it vp» Thm if democracy can
be made to bear the blame for oar failures, and we cacaot reform
democracy without changing its nature and the "American &ay of I*ife%
which we are not willing to do* we are presented with a ready made
excuse for failure, for not doing anything to iH$>rove our position
or our policies* if desaocracy is a sacred cow, and is a scapegoat
mm mm in i mm I ii i n i in
h$* Bobert Presthus, 3ha Organisational .Society* p* 1
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as well, how is change and imsroveraent possible? Vihat la the
point of striving, if the chosen fetters of democracy are going
to negate all our actions? Why thrust and reach for the mom,
if we have fallen in love with our chains?
What has been frustrating to &©, in retaking the critics
and cjcmraentators in the field of political science is the constant
under' Implication of many that doaocracy is a sort of sluggish,
inefficient, unwieldy, unworkable thing 9 perhaps a passing expert-
jnent, too expensive for anyone but the United States to mate a go
off and eventually doomed to abandonment when its ina&eouaeies -tor
dealing with the age of advanced technology are sufficiently
deacmstrated* tat one of course comes right out and says it* une
does not slaughter sacrod eowsj one hopes they will die of their
own accord* I straggle to raak© clear that 1 do not think that
democracy has the mark of Gain on it) that I think the imperfections
of a given society are not to be attributed solely to their
democratization, but the failures of men to work within a perfectly
reasonable framework, which is at least as easily adjustable to
changing technology and world>shrinking as any other foim of
government or social organisation* There are no excuses to be
found In statements which iaply that an effective course of action
was not possible because it was a democracy which was required to
make the decision*
Wa are not alone in the rise of the phenomenon of con£o;m±ty
and the decline of individualism* X think it is encouraging that
we rn^n still making somewhat of a straggle out of the process. Our

raanolithl© adversary aeests to be laboring under no such handicap*
There is no question in my* mind that eawlatlon of our seemingly
successful adversary is not the solution to our problem* In a
recent interview, Premier Khmshchev defended his slapping dcas*
of Bvgeny KvtushenJco and other ^uesian individualists in this
manner J
"When several representatives of the new gtsieration
ox our writers and painters, directed on the new
road of post war art, proved to have fallen in
determined errors, we sat at the table with them
and spoke with open heart* This was to help
these representatives or literature and art and
offer them the possibility of putting d 1 their
talent to the service of the people•too
It is obvious that there is going to be no public opinion
jbqpoaetag a massive negative on the policies of the Soviet ifeiion*
There is not going to be allowed, even one snail voice raised in
protest over their mistakes of the past, or their plans for the
future* 'Che leaders of the Soviet Union are not going to have to
take into consideration the interests of special groups in the
society* They are free to forsmilst© their effective foreign policy
if they are equal to the task*
But may we not remind ourselves that being unfettered by
democracy does not insure that a totalitarian state will be my
more omnipotent in foreign affairs than the deaocraoles of the
West h, vc roved to be*
The iioviet union has the bomb, the Chinese do not. Still
the Soviet 'Aiion has been less successful than we in forcing or
*mm*+m » —.*»*#.. i .ii lWii
U6* %a Sew Toxic times, Western Edition, April 22, 1963.
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persuading her largest ally to conform to her policies, m&
accept her judgment and leadership In the cotsmunist offensive*
Can we accuse the Soviet Onion of being unable to cotae to terms
with fore©? I thijftk that would be the last accusation to be
made of th&ro, but with all the force at their command, they are
poirerless to accojspliah sosa© things in foreign affairs* If we
grant that some of their aims may be legitaaiately frustrated, is
it not unreasonable to expect that our efforts will be crowned
with an unbroken string of successes*
It might be q£ interest to cougars the implications of
Premier Khrushchev's plan to put all the talsnts of his artists
at the service of the people, and if they refuse to oonfosm,
tear up their union card, with President Kennedy and Secretary
of State Rusk's plan for utilizing African talent in foreign
affairs, and. improving this us© by establii?Mng a aaiion&l
AewSesy of Foreign Affairs* Xn his letter to the President of
the Senate, transmitting the bill to the Congress for action the
President saids
.nally, it (the academy) aould not propagate any
Single doctrine or philosophy about the conduct of
foreign affairs* Such an institution can serve
th® cause of freedom only as it embodies the spirit
of freedom, and it can fulfill its mission only by
meeting the best standards of intellectual excellence
and academic freedom* The Academy is intended to
enable faculty and students of the highest quality
to focus our collective eixperience and knowledge on
the issues most vif$l to the advancement of our
national purpose* M^"
}km incomprehensible such a plan as this mist seem to the
k?* jfofegfo *±m &aga»in©, ^«d* 1XXI, No. 16, Apr. 19, 1963, p* 1*0*
U©* Sejar&nt of ^itate Bulletin, Vol. XLYIIX, &o* 1232,
Harch£, 1963, p. h28*

asviet mind* Xhere is no room in their society for snore than one
doctrine or philosophy about the conduct of foreign affaire* If
their method is better for achieving unanimity, md for arriving
at decisions without the necessity of debate* is it necessarily
more efficient than our system* and will it inevitably lead to
a more effective foreign policy than we are able laboriously to
evolve? &'e are comsiitted to th asition that eSny voice©
should 'be heard, end ttiegr aveiaies of approach should bo consider
and that individual ;aen still count for some thin, . on we spe;
of the people, it is not in their corporate institutionalized foria,
indistinguishable from the state, but as a mass of individuals whose
rights and freedoms are to be encroached on, only to the minimum
required for survival, not to the maximum attainable short of the
degree w^Lch «£gfe& lead to revolution*
I do not mem to say that I refuse to live in a society
where I do not have absolute freedom, or perhaps license as
distinguished from freedom • I am perfectly willing to sive up
whatever degree of freedom necessary to the formulation and
saeecution of an effective foreign policy, i'he millions who
serve in the armed forces and other a .eaeies or government, give
up S considerable degree of freedom cheerfully. But I m not
prepared, to admit that I am forced to mate© a decision between a
democratic form of government and ail effective foreign policy. i:hey
have not, and cannot be shown to be Mutually e^clusivv..
The Government of the United States is perfectly capable of
keeping a secret %&mn it must# The; "Manhattan rrojecV which

produced the first atomic bomb is an excellent 0x8^X0 • The
weekend proceeding the IMMMHMMI iie Cuban Blockade in
current history is mother example* It is not a requirement of
doaocratie government that a plebiscite be held to determine if
the (Jolted States was going to invade, blockade, or accept the
presence of offensive missiles in Cuba* It is tine function of a
<$emocracy to debate long range policy with regard to a continuing
menace represented by a hostile government ninety miles away* If
the "Bay of Pig»w was a mistake, it should be examined so that
Biietatos similar to it are riot mode in the future* A democracy
can afford to adroit that it ;;*ay have made a mistake* If misU&os
are aov&r exposed, how are we to learn from then? is not this
peculiarity of a democratic government, that it has critics, end
is forced to hear them, even if it does not heed them, an
advantage, rather than a disadvantage over the long run?
James Bryce, writing in IBS? put hie £inger on the advantages
.dntaining a vociferous minority In a democracy in Ms classic,
"The ARierieen Comiaonwealth*"
"Where a majority has erred, (we might substitute
'*overnaent) the only remedy against the prolongation
or repetition of its error is in the continued
orotesta and agitation of the minority, an agitation
which ought to be peaceably conducted, carried cm by
voice and pen, but which must be vehement enough to
reuse the people and deliver them from the
consequences of their blunders* "^
James Bryce goo® on to r It a free country* . . ten raen
So
who care, are worth a hundred who do not,*"^ In this brief statement
1*9. Jartes Bryce, Further i&fe&uarda .'gainst. ^a^prlty forariny,
Esas&xp% from, The ika^riean CoanonHQalth, m fteo h» Christe-asoa md
Robert 0§ Jle^lllxams, op, cit#, p* S
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i»ay be found part of the hop© £or democratic governments, and tiheir
forei&n policies. Uertran-'.. -JJL describes the reaction of the
individual in the tighter sac I .3 of modern ti»ies as being
on© of despair* The little in an according to Hussoll feels that the
part one citiaen can obtain in controlling policy is usually
infinitesimal, and he feels that it is bettor in tho circumstances
to forget public affairs an as ?mich enjoyment by tho way
51
as the times permit. It is 1 of fidc&inf while born**
und the orchestra is large. The Athenians would say along with
Periclese that such men had no business in a democracy at all.
And so many in a democracy are like unto Lord Russell*
s
le.
.'•answer might take some sach form as this, So What*
don't want the entire mss of the people cluttering up the debate
anyway* The answer is flip, and not really serious, but it contains
some element of truth* The j;reat mass of the people in a large
democratic country cannot participate in the debate which
necessary for deciding questions of policy* They will be heard on
some matters, but only when they are led, in some mysterious way*
not to be explained hy influences of --mss madia, or the legerdemain
of Madison Avenue* in large part, except for CiUesticns which
affect their vital interests, the people are content to let
administration ;jovcrrj, and thus stable gpveraftfftt is achieved* And
even MbeH incensed over an issue, their interest is short liv
and cannot be sustained over any great period of tftne, wiles* events
H i— m l
,
1111 » 11 « l» 1 i i « l 1111 11 . win
>U Haasell, qp ifrj Qtfa* P» 1&~9»

conspire to keep the issue alive ami before the public.
The foregoing remarks are based on V. o. Key's valiant
atfceaspt to make some sense out can electoral behavior*
With considerably snore caution than X have demonstrated he
produces such tentative conclusions as»
rtThe data suggest that the generation of support Tor
ate American foreign policy nsy depend en
the maintenance of a relatively high level of
erity* \o number of parsons
pinched economically increases, so does the number
rowal into our national uhell*
This is not to say that the poor and distressed rise
rip Is isolationist anger, but only that when such
people feel threatened
,
political leaders with their own
MB MB stir l Q*t involvement
abroad."^
Key is of coarse quite correct in relating the domestic economy
to foreign involvements, but he does not attribute to the people in
««y w«^* the aassivs veto decried by Salter Irippman* bat only a
susceptibility to be swayed when in peril , by leadership which may
not be responsible, and which raay itself be mislead* Infallibility
is not clatoed for the eoflfeinatioan of the people en-Rtasse and their
leaders in a continuous dialogue. In fact the condition Key
describes is not one of a dialogue at all* but a monologue
directed at a pro-sold audience*
have perhaps neglected the proper role of the think
minority of the people in the ms&ntainsnce of a viable democracy,
which is not incapable of formulating and carrying out an. effective
foreiv.Ti policy* The percentage of persons who do not feel a
£2* Key, op* oit* p. 1&3.

responsibility for knowing what is going on is extremely largo.
In the coiMunity of persons who speak, write, and this-- -it
toes© problems, the conscleusnesa oi: Uiis great apathy <aay not
always bo clear* An Incredible number of people sis^ly don't want
to know, and would wuch prefer the sports pare to be the front page
of their daily newspaper, followed by entertainment news, sniusing
columnists who don't require deep thought to ibllow, p#
an expose or %*» of Elizabeth Taylor's latest adventure wi
Richard Burton, Except at election fcima*. these people largely do
not matter*
The persons who do natter sre rattier hard to identify
to classify, and even store issportant, underft <ia i* I hr-.vo found
the problem stated nowhere more succinctly again than i. .'• .
"The srgu»-;nt aaoutit. -siti&lly to &• position
that the masses do not corrupt themsolves j if they
are corrupt, they have been corrupted* If this
hypothesis has a substantial strain of validity,
I critical element for ttw j.di of a doscuratic
order consists in the beliefs, standards and competence
of those who constitute Mid iaflusntiaLs, the opinion
loaders, the political activists in the order* That
group, as has been made plain, refuses to define itself
with great clarity in the >^ierican system* yet analysis
after snaly s to its existence* If a democracy
tends toward indecision, decay, and disaster, the
f
,_
responsibility rests here, not in the mom of to ie*"~> -}
If there is no dialogue between tfeti masses of tbt ie &u&
.r leaders, except at sic .a, and th; Ls ' | ,art of
the dialogs largely consists of their MUMP ^tions
posed by the pollen, of pubi '.lion, ttx.- Ml Still exist a
continuing dialogue between the influentiais, the opinion leaders,
Plllll ! ».. H I I H i m . II »
53-*- Key* op* clt., p. !&3
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the political activists, and the government. There is discussion
within and among these groves* and their opinions are available
to the government. The 1,350 persons and organ iaation..
chose t -ress their opinions on the Tra<- msion Act of 1962
are a ease in point.
The sjjany suggestions that fee level of dlseus : jst be
raised tyre solidly reasoned, and are not to b© dv i . The z-tethods
are in doubt, Tim ,-. m$ with notable exception haw
abdicated a lar, .t of their v ability, •.rly
respectable magazines of small or circulation, squeeaed for
advertising revenue by television $m >rixig their product more
and more to entertainment than Information, to aensatlornil - 3
raore ttuMi p*portiag in depth j they do not provide an adequate
forum for soric <n»
_ lation of the new "slick 1 ' format of "The Uation,"
"The Saturday Review, " the sli .iantic fy, n the
.,yw cover of "Harpers"*** devoted to Alcoholics .anonyiflous, tho
steady'- decline of WWW and • lal coverage in dally newspapers,
and even the concentrated c. .d grtgi -ork Times,~^
makes one bonder if our 81 raisi
discussion is not being ft* changes which are taking
ce in the traditional forums,
,:skind T s " doe;; not seem to be (ft adequate
replacement Tor what we have lost, or are in the process oT lofting.
#w Harpers H*g«jSin*, Vol. 226, Ho, 13^3, February 1963,
55* Dwi^ht ^acdonald, Ttie, Mew iork yhacs, Alas,,, ^squire,
Vol. IX19 Mos. U and >', April and '>av7 i^3»
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and in spite of the efforts of the public affairs departments of
the television networks, an audio-visual program is an ephemeral
thing «wi is not well calculated to take the place of the printed
word*
But perhaps I aake the charge of sensationalise too lightly?
there are ecsae pretty sensational things to discuss in our thermo-
nuclear age. As an example I might cite a long footnote in Herman
Kahn's "Thinking About the tftthinkable." He describes one
sensational subject that I had long wanted to hear discussed*
Since I was 18 years old in the last year of our nuclear monopoly,
and was not thinking much about wars* (everybody knew there were at least
twenty years between r&ajor wars) , I could not say that there had
been no discussion of ways and means of maintaining it at the time,
I was sisply an apathetic yotsog American male who didn't want to
know bad enough to find out.
But later X wondered if anyone of stature had considered,
when it beotfw obvious that the Soviet Union was not going to
cooperate in the post-war world, the possibility of isposiag the
"Pax Araericana" on the world with the credible threat of our atomic
boobs* m& a delivery system like ft£6 to wield it. In other words,
when we were in a position to retain our nuclear monopoly by force,
was there any tough thinker around to which the solution, (unthinkable
as it might have been) occurred?
Of all people, Lord Bertrand Russell
J
On page 235 oi Herman Kaim's admirable small book is the
story from the London Observer of Lord Russell speaking to bpQ

k$
London students and schoolteachers at a Hew Commonwealth Schools
Conference,
"Either we must have a war against .Russia before
she has the atom bomb or we will have to lie down
and let them govern us*..
"Before they were tempted to paralyse any
war effort, trade unionists in Astern countries
should be taught that the Soviet way of life had
nothing to offer them. Fearing the horror of a
future war -was no way to prevent it, 'Anything is
better than submission,' he said,"£6
If we hear and see a different Bortrand Russell now, it
might be well to hark back to his speech to the schoolteachers.
Mobody listened to him then, \*e lost our nuclear monopoly, and
the war he envisaged with both sides having the bomb, and a
vastly more destructive bomb to the one he was thinking about, has
become a real possibility. Faced with a situation he had tried to
forestall, he has, fifteen years later, the courage of his convictions
then. If he is pictured in our popular tress as a pitiable figure, a
senile, doddering old fool, sitting on the ground in Trafalgar
Square, or Piccadilly Circus, with the fuzzy thinkers, ana the
unwashed rabble, to protest the presence of Polaris submarines in
Holy Loch, it might be well to remember him as he was then, a
prophet who counselled retention of our monopoly of atomic weapons,
or surrender.
I sometimes wonder too, if after fourteen years of living in
a world, in which a supposedly implacable eneny holds the power of
our total destruction, while we oppose him with more of the sa^ie,
£6. Kahn, Thinking About the Lnthlnkable, op, cit., p, 235

we are ready to think about the implications o.f the possession
of some sort of ultimate weapon, perhaps not in the class of high
explosives at all. I wonder if we are prepared to discuss
seriously retaining a monopoly of such a weapon, even if we have
to risk killing millions to do it. I wonder if we have really
"come to terms with force," as Kenneth Thompson phrases it.
In spite of some misgivings I have not abandoned the
position taken in the earlier t>ortion of this paper. I do not
think that viable democratic srovemment and an effective foreign
policy are irreconcilable aims. I think the history of the
recent past is more encouraging than the more distant past.
I see hope in the fact that writers like Herman Kahn and T. ft,
£8
Feherenbach, in his new book., "This Kind of War*** are rescuing
the Korean encounter from the myth which had grown up around it,
that it was an &aerican defeat from which we gained nothin .
I am encouraged by the fact that, although one is inundated
by stories of the ineffectiveness of our intervention in the
$9
"Dirty Little War* in Viet asm* there has been no swell of public
opinion dema^din^; that we get out and bring the boys back home.
The people have shown a willingness to accept five years as a
reasonable forecast of our involvement, with no real assurances
that we will win a famous victory* There is even evidence that we
will win a famous victory. There is even evidence that we are
developing some understanding that in a nuclear age, one does not
. jm'1»iHiii*WMWI«WW
5>7, Thompson, op* clt., p. 2D?
JJB, T. ft* Fehrenbach, This Kind of .ar , ine Haedllan Co.,
New lork, 1963.
5>'9. Jerry % iose, I'm Hit A I'm Hit
A
Saturday Evening I ost,
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back bis opponent into a corner from which there is no escape
abort of total war or abject surrender. Surely this If olitical
maturity of the highest order, M&d it is being evidenced in a
democracy which lets Barry Gcldwaters, Joseph tVelches, and Willlsea
?. Buckley's have their say.
I am not prepared to ot with my assurance that
democracy will survive the e~rperi'-nee of existence in a world
dominated by the threat of the bomb. As war approaches raore
closely, cower tends to concentrate in the government, and
{Stsiocratie institutions lose BOOB of their essential characteristics*
Involvement in a finite number of snail limited wars may tend to
have the sane effect. »t consciously abandon democratic
government} we m*y just let it slip through our fingers* I m
personally convinced that, this wmli be a step backward for the
Statu der<ocracies, but I at* not c*ed to say that it will
constitute an irrevocable disaster* The ideas, and ideals of
democracy, ill defined as they :<nay be, meaning different things to
different men, but V f ways to the majority of men,
will survive, and revive if there is a world surviving in which
y- ma.f exist* The organisation of society is both a revolutionary
mo : .lutionary process. Democracy would seem to be a necessary
e in the fai march of humanity toward true harmony and
justice in the relations betx^een man and man. I don't think
we should abandon it li:;htly, oven for the sake of a conviction that
the elusive aim of an effective foreipn policy is bein>; hampered by
some ©f its ill-defined imperfections.
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